
Choose Safety over Profits!

REDUCE number of spent fuel assemblies in each storage canisters. This lowers heat and radiation levels, reduces risks of failure, reduces amount of potential radiation releases. *Edison's Plan:*Squeeze 32 fuel assemblies in a canister size similar to the current 24 fuel assembly canister (67.19" vs. 69.76" diameter). And load hotter fuel.¹

CAN each fuel assembly. Enclosing each fuel assembly in a stainless steel failed fuel can prior to loading into the dry canister improves retrievability of fuel assemblies and improves ability to transport the waste. **Edison's Plan**: Use new 32PTH2-DSC canisters that have NO capability to put damaged fuel assemblies into failed fuel cans. Areva created a new definition of "damaged fuel" just for this canister.². Reasons to can:




- 1. **Fuel can degrade the protective cladding as it cools in the canister**. The higher the burnup level, the higher likelihood of cladding failure.³ (*Per Peterson was not aware of this, but now confirms this*).
- 2. **NRC requires each fuel assembly be retrievable** so it can be transferred to another container when needed and/or transported. By canning each fuel assembly, it increases the likelihood the assembly will be retrievable if the cladding fails.⁴
- 3. Fuel burnup levels as low as 30 GWd/MTU are more likely to damage cladding.5
- **4. No feasible method exists to fully inspect fuel assemblies for damage** prior to loading into dry canisters. Therefore, all fuel assemblies should be treated as damaged and canned.⁶



Cladding Damage

- **5. Unknown damage to cladding** from extended storage. Fuel may remain on-site for 60+ years.⁷
- **6. Higher risk of radiation release** from transportation accident, especially high burnup fuel.⁸
- 7. No proven method to transfer damaged spent fuel assemblies from a failed canister to another canister.
- **8. Coastal environment** degrades stainless steel canisters, increasing risk of failure.⁹ This includes the canisters Edison plants to use with the 316L SS (stainless steel).
- 9. **Areva M5 protective cladding** shows higher evidence of failure with higher burnup fuel than previous Zirconium cladding material. *Edison received NRC approval to use M5 cladding* 11



- 10. No technology to monitor inside dry canisters.¹²
- **11. No means of confirming the presence of helium in welded containers** or casks, nor is there a requirement for periodically inspecting the integrity of the closure welds for defects. If helium leaks and air enters the canister or cask, this, together with the moisture in the air, can result in corrosion of the fuel cladding, the canister, and the cask ¹³
- **12. Unknown cladding damage from thermal heat**. Japan limit peak cladding temperature to 275°C, much lower than the 400°C peak cladding temperature limit in the United States. More realistic thermal calculations are needed.¹⁴

REMOTELY monitor spent fuel pool water level. Implement a system to monitor spent fuel pool water levels remotely as required by the NRC (after the Fukushima nuclear meltdown). ¹⁵ *Edison's Plan: requested exemption from this requirement.* ¹⁶

COOL spent fuel using most conservative cooling requirements. NUHOMS® dry canister specifications state up to 15+ years.¹⁷ *Edison's Plan: Use shorter cooling periods (5-7 years).*

ADD skilled staff. Adequate technical staff is needed in order to have expertise to make safe decisions and to adequately review vendor product claims. Major radiation dangers exist with spent fuel in pools and canisters. Senators requested the NRC cease exempting licensees of decommissioning nuclear reactors from its emergency response and security regulations. **Italian: Eliminated 39 emergency response positions. **Edison received an NRC Notice of Violation for this. **Plan: Eliminated 39 emergency response positions. **Edison received an NRC Notice of Violation for this. **Pelies on vendor expertise. Rrequested exemption from staffing requirements (e.g., substitute "Fuel Handlers" for trained Operators). **20

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